By Payal Chawla
Indian arbitration jurisprudence has, in recent months, offered something worth acknowledging: a considerable degree of doctrinal consistency. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court and High Courts largely reaffirm principles that have emerged over the past several years: consent remains foundational, jurisdictional questions are ordinarily left to the tribunal, unilateral appointments remain suspect, and Section 34 is not an avenue for merits review. This consistency, and the judicial discipline it reflects, is significant. At the same time, recent decisions identify areas where the existing framework reveals gaps and may need to evolve. It is against these two strands, doctrinal consistency and measured suggestions for reform, that some recent judgments are worth examining.
Kompetenz-kompetenz remains central
In GVV Constructions Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, the Supreme Court considered whether termination of a railway contract constituted an “excepted matter”. It held that whether a particular dispute falls within such a contractual exclusion is ordinarily a matter for the tribunal to decide under Section 16. A writ court ought not to predetermine or circumscribe that jurisdictional inquiry.
This approach is consistent with the broader judicial movement away from elaborate threshold adjudication and towards allowing arbitral tribunals to decide contested questions of jurisdiction, limitation and contractual arbitrability.
Consent remains foundational
Perhaps the clearest reminder that arbitration ultimately rests upon consent comes from the Delhi High Court in Sarr Freights Corporation v. Argo Coral Maritime Ltd. The parties’ preliminary correspondence referred to London arbitration, but their subsequently signed Booking Note incorporated only rider clauses 20 to 41, whereas the arbitration clause was Clause 43. The Division Bench held that prior negotiations could not be used to add an arbitration clause to an unambiguous final written contract which superseded those negotiations. Having found that no arbitration agreement existed, the Court restrained continuation of the LMAA arbitration. Therefore, prior negotiations cannot ordinarily be used to insert an arbitration clause omitted from a subsequent clear and final signed contract.
In Arth Micro Finance Pvt. Ltd. v. Shivalik Small Finance Bank Ltd., the Supreme Court held that where an arbitral tribunal was purportedly appointed by consent, but there was nothing on record to establish such consent and the appointment had been expressly objected to, including on the ground of the tribunal’s close links with the respondent, the very initiation of the arbitration was non est in law. The Court consequently set aside the tribunal’s Section 17 orders freezing bank accounts, transferring funds and permitting takeover of assets, and directed restitution of amounts and restoration of property. Importantly, while the initiation of the arbitration through the improperly constituted tribunal was held to be non est, the underlying arbitration agreement was preserved: the Court appointed a fresh independent arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes.
At the same time, the principle of incorporation remains well established. In National Skill Development Corporation v. Surya Wires Pvt. Ltd., personal guarantees did not independently contain arbitration clauses, but were expressly integrated into loan agreements which did. The Court held that the arbitration agreement stood incorporated into the guarantees under Section 7(5), emphasising the interconnected nature of the documents and the parties’ expressed contractual intention. An arbitration clause may therefore bind a party through an interconnected instrument where the contractual documents clearly demonstrate incorporation under Section 7(5).
Interim measures and non-signatories
Courts have also taken a pragmatic approach to preservation of the arbitral subject matter. In COAF FZE v. Avanikailani Commodities LLC, the Karnataka High Court held that Section 9 protection may extend against a non-signatory asserting rights over the very property forming the subject matter of arbitration. Such an order preserves the res; it does not necessarily determine whether the non-signatory is ultimately bound by the arbitration agreement. Section 9 can therefore reach a non-signatory where necessary to preserve the arbitral res without thereby imposing substantive arbitral liability upon that party.
Unilateral appointments remain under strict scrutiny
The constitution of arbitral tribunals remains an active area of litigation. In Madhyachal Steels Pvt. Ltd. v. Clix Capital Services Pvt. Ltd., the Delhi High Court held that a lender prohibited from unilaterally appointing an arbitrator cannot cure the problem by delegating its unilateral appointment power to an ostensibly independent third-party institution. The source of the appointment power, rather than merely the identity of the person exercising it, was critical. A party which cannot itself unilaterally appoint an arbitrator cannot sanitise that power merely by delegating the appointment to a third party.
Section 34: patent illegality and arbitrator’s domain reiterated
Recent cases also sharpen the boundary between legitimate Section 34 scrutiny and impermissible merits review.
In Otsuka Chemical (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Trans Engineers India Pvt. Ltd., the Delhi High Court Division Bench restored a “NIL” award after finding that the Section 34 court had effectively reassessed the evidence and substituted its interpretation of the contract for the arbitrator’s plausible view. A Section 34 court cannot replace an arbitrator’s plausible contractual interpretation merely because another view of the evidence appears preferable.
However, in State Project Director v. KMV Projects, the Karnataka High Court interfered with awards of escalation, overheads and loss of profit which lacked the necessary pleading and evidentiary foundation. The judgment is particularly significant for construction arbitration: formulae such as Hudson cannot substitute for proof that loss was actually suffered. Judicial deference to an arbitral award does not protect damages which have no adequate pleading or evidentiary foundation.
Similarly, in Jaipur Development Authority v. Rohan Rajdeep Rajasthan Infra Project Ltd., the Rajasthan High Court emphasised that although courts cannot interfere merely because another contractual interpretation is possible, an arbitrator cannot use “interpretation” to rewrite the parties’ allocation of contractual risk. An arbitrator may interpret the parties’ bargain, but cannot create a bargain which the parties never made. The Court also reiterated that, in relation to a corrigendum award, jurisdiction under Section 33(1)(a) is confined to the correction of “errors in computation, any clerical or typographical errors or any other errors of a similar nature” and does not extend to substantive modification of the award.
International commercial arbitration: a narrower challenge
Ratnagiri Gas and Power Pvt. Ltd. v. Dinowic Pte Ltd. provides an important reminder about India-seated international commercial arbitrations. Because one party was foreign, Section 34(2A), and consequently the patent-illegality ground, was unavailable. The Court observed that “any challenge to an award in respect of construction of terms of a contract by an arbitral tribunal falls under patent illegality”, a ground which is unavailable for challenging an award arising out of an international commercial arbitration. An alleged error in contractual interpretation therefore cannot be repackaged as a public-policy challenge to circumvent the statutory exclusion of patent illegality.
Enforcement: deposit is not payment
One of the most significant recent decisions is the Supreme Court’s National Seeds Corporation Ltd. v. National Agro Seed Corporation (India). The Supreme Court considered whether deposit of an awarded amount in Court during challenge proceedings stops the accrual of interest. The Award-Debtor had deposited 50% of the principal pursuant to a conditional stay under Section 34 and subsequently deposited the balance; however, it resisted the Award-Holder’s attempts to withdraw the amount, and the High Court initially permitted partial withdrawal only against security. The Supreme Court held that a deposit is not synonymous with payment: for interest to cease under Order XXI Rule 1 CPC, the amount must be unconditionally available to the Award-Holder for withdrawal. If withdrawal is opposed or conditional upon furnishing security, interest continues; conversely, once the amount is unconditionally available, the Award-Holder cannot allow interest to accumulate merely by failing to withdraw it. On the facts, interest therefore continued until 8 September 2022, when the amount became unconditionally available.
The ruling is significant when compared with DLF Ltd. v. Koncar Generators & Motors Ltd., which had observed that even where withdrawal was conditional upon furnishing security, the Award-Holder had access to the money and should either furnish security or seek modification of the condition. National Seeds, while noticing DLF, distils the governing principles in terms which appear to draw a sharper distinction: unconditional availability for withdrawal is the touchstone for cessation of interest, and withdrawal subject to security does not constitute payment in satisfaction of the award. Noting the wider lack of uniformity in the treatment of court deposits, the Court also requested the Law Commission of India to consider suitable legislation standardising the quantum, manner and investment of deposits, conditions of withdrawal, accrual and cessation of interest, and final adjustment of interest earned, after considering comparative regimes and consulting the RBI, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Law and Justice.
The Direction of Travel
The underlying theme is therefore not simply greater or lesser judicial intervention. It is more calibrated intervention: restraint where the tribunal is entitled to decide, scrutiny where the foundations of consent or adjudication fail, and effective assistance where an award has reached the stage of enforcement. The emerging approach is therefore not hands-off, but calibrated: deference where the arbitral process should be allowed to operate, intervention where the integrity of that process requires it, and suggestions for reform where the existing legislative and judicial framework warrants intervention.
Payal Chawla is a practising advocate specialising in commercial law and disputes. The author recognises the assistance of Ms Manisha Dahiya, Advocate.
This article first appeared in the Newsletter of the Nani Palkhivala Arbitration Centre (NPAC) for the month of September 2026.
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